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Recent studies on labour, the political Left, and immigration have created the impres-
sion that the deportation policy of the Canadian government was designed to control radicals 
and to expel surplus labour. This study, by tracing the evolution of the policy from its 
inception in the 1870s through to the late 1930s, presents a different view. The deportation 
policy reflected the conservatism of a society reluctant to accept the realities of an emerging 
urban, industrial world. The determination of the middle class to resist the cost of adequate 
social services contributed to the deportations, especially during periods of economic 
recession. 
Des etudes recentes sur les travailleurs, Ia gauche et I' immigration au Canada ont sug-
gere que Ia politique suivie par les autorites federales visait a controler les elements radi-
caux et a expulser Ia main-d'reuvre excedentaire. En retrayant I'evolution de cette politique 
depuis son instauration dans les annees 1870 jtisqu'a Ia fin des annees trente, nous propo-
sons ici une interpretation differente. La politique de deportation refletait le conservatisme 
d'une societe refractaire aux realites montantes du monde urbain et industriel. Les depor-
tations s'expliquent, surtout en temps de recession, par Ia ferme resistance qu'opposerent les 
classes moyennes a )'imposition de couteux services sociaux. 
To deport "the undesirable alien and land him back in the bilgewaters 
of European Civilization from whence he sprung and to which he properly 
belongs" 1 and "to clean the aliens out of this community and ship them 
back to their happy homes in Europe which vomitted them forth a decade 
ago" 2 are phrases which have been used to characterize the strong nativist 
sentiment in Winnipeg during the General Sympathetic Strike of 1919. 
Furthermore, it has been asserted that the government in Ottawa "intro-
duced an 'Act to Amend the Immigration Act', which was one of the least 
debated and most hurriedly passed pieces of legislation in the history of 
Canada", so as to meet these demands. 3 An authoritative study of the Win-
nipeg Strike states that four "foreigners were summarily deported". 4 A 
* Department of History , Carleton University. 
1 Norman PENNER, ed. , Winnipeg 1919: The Striker:( own History ofthe Winnipeg 
General Strike (Toronto : James Lewis & Samuel, 1973), p . xviii. 
2 Donald AVERY, 'Dangerous Foreigners'; European Immigrant Workers and 
Labour Radicalism in Canada, /896-1932 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979), p. 84. 
3 David J. BERCUSON , Confrontation at Winnipeg: Labour, Industrial Relations 
and the General Strike (Montreal: McGill- Queen's University Press, 1974), p. 163. 
4 Kenneth McNAUGHT and D. J. BERCUSON, The Winnipeg Strike: 1919 (Toronto: 
Longman, 1974), p. 80. 
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pamphlet published in 1920 by the Winnipeg Defence Committee, however, 
and which has since been reprinted, claims that after many delays the four 
men were brought before an immigration board of inquiry and only one 
was deported on a charge unrelated to the strike. 5 Despite the confusion 
over the facts in this case, as well as in a number of other instances, 
there has been a general impression that the aim of the deportation policy 
was to rid Canada of political and labour radicals . 6 
More recently, in his study of continental European immigrant 
workers in Canada between 1896 and 1932, Donald A very has suggested 
that deportations were also used by the government to expel surplus labour. 
He observed that deportations were used most frequently during economic 
depressions and concluded from this that Canada "in practice" followed 
the German gastarbeiter policy where "an expendable labour force takes 
its problems away with it when it is re-exported". 7 
Neither of these two views of deportations has been seriously tested. 
On closer study it becomes evident that the 60,000 deportations before 
World War II bore more relation to the inadequacy and parsimony of social 
services in Canada than to political repression or to a labour policy. Since 
social services, in general, were inadequate in Canada, there often were 
pressures by local governments to deny these services to recent immigrants. 
The federal government refused to assume any responsibility for providing 
the needed services and resorted to the most expedient solution -
deportation. 
I 
The deportation of immigrants was a measure adopted by the federal 
government by virtue of its responsibility for immigration. Section 95 of 
the British North America Act made immigration a concurrent responsibility 
of the federal and provincial governments. The former established its 
sphere of jurisdiction through the Immigration Act of 1869 (32, 33 Vic. 
cap. 10). The two levels of government were to share the right to recruit 
immigrants, but the federal government assumed the sole responsibility for 
regulating the admission of the immigrants. To fulfil this role immigration 
officers were established at ports of entry and quarantine stations were 
provided where needed. The only provision attempting to regulate admis-
sion prohibited the entry of "every lunatic, idiot, deaf, dumb, blind or 
infirm person" unless there was a bond guaranteeing maintenance for three 
years. In 1872 the amended Immigration Act (35 Vic. cap. 28) added a 
clause permitting the prohibition of "criminal and vicious classes". In 1887 
(50, 51 Vic. cap. 34) the Immigration Branch obtained the power to return 
5 PENNER, Winnipeg , pp. 219-20. 
6 AVERY , 'Dangerous Foreigners', pp. 86-88 ; J. PETRYSHYN, "R. B. Bennett and 
the Communists", Journal of Canadian Studies, 9 (November 1974): 43-55. 
7 AvERY, 'Dangerous Foreigners' , p. 142. Also see B. A. ROBERTS, "Purely 
Administrative Proceedings: The Management of Canadian Deportation, Montreal, 1900-
1935" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Ottawa, 1980), p. 450. 
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these prohibited immigrants "to the port whence they came to Canada", 
but there was no authority to deport immigrants once they had been 
landed. Deportations were nonetheless carried out. 
Not much is known about the number of deportations from Canada 
in the nineteenth century, but it is evident that a set policy existed. The 
federal government took the position that since it admitted the immigrants 
it was consequently compelled to bear the responsibility for any immigrants 
who proved to be unsatisfactory. 
The rule of the Department is that immigrants who have not been over one 
year in the country, are, in some measure, under the care of the Department; 
and if it has been found, after they have come to the country, that from illness 
or bodily infirmity, they have been unable to get their living, they have been 
sent back, as the simplest and cheapest mode of dealing with them. 8 
This policy statement was first made in the mid-1870s and was to remain 
the dominant principle for over six decades. 
The initial deportation policy was established in 1876. Apparently 
some French immigrants had wanted to return to France because the 
economic depression then present in Canada prevented them from securing 
agricultural employment, and they lacked sufficient funds for the return 
passage. By the time that 230 were deported, and $5,000 was spent on the 
effort, the government decided that too many immigrants were taking ad-
vantage of the concession and the programme was terminated. To provide 
necessary relief was justifiable, but to cater to those who were merely 
disappointed with their first impressions of Canada was not acceptable. 
After the incident of 1876 the government obtained a concession from the 
steamship lines to provide free transportation for immigrants who were 
being returned within one year of their arrival. The transportation compa-
nies were very reluctant to provide the service, and only did so when the 
Immigration Branch was able to convince them that the immigrants were 
genuinely unable to provide for themselves. 9 
Incomplete information suggests that during the 1890s some forty to 
fifty people were "returned". 10 These deportations concerned people who, 
because of "physical and mental debility", were unable to make a liveli-
hood in Canada. In a few cases these immigrants were "paupers" who 
were sent to Canada by relatives or by public institutions, but in the 
majority of cases the immigrants had come to Canada on their own. In at 
least two cases, men who had received serious injuries while working in 
Canada were returned. Both of them had exhausted their savings while 
receiving medical attention and were eager to return to their former homes, 
one to his family in Austria and the other to friends in Denmark. 11 On 
8 CANADA, PARLIAMENT. House of Commons Journals XI (1877): Appendix No. 
6, Committee on Immigration and Colonization, p. 16. 
9 Public Archives of Canada (hereafter PAC), Immigration Branch Records (here-
after IB), F. 837(1), A. M. Burgess, Deputy Minister, to D. McNicoll, CPR, 19 March 
1895; McNicoll to Burgess, 21 March 1895; Burgess to McNicoll, 25 March 1895. 
10 IB, F. 837(1); DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, Annual Report, 1895-96 to 1899-
1900. See the reports by the immigration officer at Montreal. 
11 IB, F. 837(1), H. & A. Allan, shipping agents, Montreal, to L. Pereira, 26 
December 1894; Pereira to McNicoll, 11 March 1895. 
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the whole it appears that these deported immigrants were not averse to 
returning to their former homelands. 
The deportations during the 1890s were usually initiated by immigra-
tion officers, but increasingly complaints were received from other sources. 
In 1894 the Quebec government issued one of a long series of complaints 
charging the federal government with admitting insane immigrants and 
placing the burden of their institutional care on the people of Quebec. 12 
Municipalities also complained about having to take care of destitute im-
migrants. In 1897 Calgary felt that the immigrants arriving from the slums 
of large European cities were an "excessive burden on the citizens". The 
government was urged to ensure that Canada not become "the dumping 
ground for the riff-raff of Europe". 13 The Toronto Trades and Labor 
Council also expressed concern that ''people likely to become a menace or 
a burden to any section or class of those already in the country" not be 
admitted. 14 Such calls for restraint in recruiting did not alter the immigra-
tion policy, especially in view of the frequent demands from other quarters 
that the country needed a larger population. Rather than impose restric-
tions on immigration, there was an increasing willingness in the late 1890s 
to deport immigrants who failed to cope with the Canadian environment. 
Since the federal government steadfastly refused to enter the field of social 
services, a jurisdiction which was exclusively the responsibility of the 
provinces, deportation was used to solve the occasional dispute over 
responsibility for destitute immigrants. 15 
As immigration began to increase and complaints about undesirable 
immigrants mounted, the government made some moves to restrict im-
migration. In 1902 an amendment to the Immigration Act (2 Ed. VII 
cap. 14) prohibited the landing of diseased immigrants and provided for the 
return of any immigrant who entered Canada in contravention of the Im-
migration Act. This was the first legislative recognition of the power to 
deport immigrants after they had been legally landed. Later in the year 
regulations were made for the proper inspection of all immigrants by 
medical officers. Immigrants who were criminals, insane, epileptics, idiots, 
blind, deaf and dumb, "defectives", advanced consumptives, or suffering 
from chronic venereal disease were to be refused admission. Those who 
were deformed, crippled, suffered dangerous, contagious or loathsome 
diseases not dangerous to life were to be prohibited "if they are likely to 
become a public charge". Those suffering from readily curable physical 
diseases were to be detained for treatment at a detention hospital. 16 It 
12 IB, F. 837(1). P.C. (Privy Council) 387J, 31 July 1894. 
13 IB, F. 15197(1), City of Calgary Council, resolution, 23 March 1897. 
14 IB, F. 23624, Report of the Legislative Committee of the Toronto Trades and 
Labor Council, 4 October 1895. 
15 The Federal government contributed some funds to hospitals in Western 
Canada to subsidize the costs of treating immigrants and at various times gave agricultural 
settlers aid, but no substantial assistance was given to the provinces until well after World 
War II. See Freda HAWKINS, Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern 
(Montreal: McGill- Queen's University Press, 1972), p. 192. 
16 IB, F. 653(1), Instructions for the medical inspection of immigrants, 15 March 
1904. 
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also became the duty of the medical officer to "return" immigrants who 
had obtained entry in contravention of these provisions. 
A sharp increase in the number of deportations followed the appoint-
ment of these officials. In his report for the fiscal year 1903-4 the Chief 
Medical Officer, Dr P. Bryce, reported the deportation of 85 immigrants-
66 British, 9 Scandinavians, 4 Finns, 3 Italians, and one each from Russia, 
Germany and Romania. These immigrants had been deported "under the 
order of a medical inspector'' or they had ''at their own request been 
returned Home", after realizing "their inability to make a living owing to 
physical disease". 17 Dr Bryce, concerned with "scientific" explanations, 
argued that the relatively high proportion of British deportations was due 
to social conditioning, and not to strictly physical or mental soundness. 
For a century the poor law unions and the many charitable institutions, especial-
ly of England, have taught the people to resort, when ill, to these institutions as 
a matter of course, and hence when such immigrants in a new land have as 
yet no permanent abode they naturally would return to the immigration agency 
and hospital to claim that assistance to which they have been accustomed. 
Persons from continental countries have not, in the same degree , been ac-
customed to such charities; they do not know the routine method of obtaining 
such assistance, are more largely engaged in pursuits outside the cities and 
towns, and besides are more accustomed to a ruder and less humane social 
life, and are more content to bear patiently with their ills, either physical or 
social. 18 
It was also pointed out that despite the fact that England was seventy-
eight percent urban, deportations were few in relation to total immigration. 
It was not difficult for the Immigration Branch to rationalize this sudden 
increase in deportations. · 
The deportations reflected the Canadian attitude towards ''paupers'', 
the strongly held values of individualism and free enterprise which had 
developed in the frontier society of British North America. It had been a 
society where poverty was frequent, but "dependency carried with it the 
despised label of 'pauper' and was widely regarded as a sign of personal 
failure if not moral obloquy". 19 The development of an urban, industrial 
Canada in the early twentieth century was not accompanied by any change 
in attitudes. A 1912 report of the Assoc~ated Charities of Winnipeg 
characterized the failure of Canadians to face the new realities. 
If material assistance was all that was needed, if the families seeking it could 
in all cases be relied upon to use it in such a way that they would quickly 
become self-supporting the work of this department would be easy. Unfor-
tunately, the large majority of applications for relief are caused by thriftless-
ness, mismanagement, unemployment due to incompetence, intemperance, im-
morality, desertion of the family and domestic quarrels. In such cases the mere 
giving of relief tends rather to induce pauperism than to reduce poverty. 20 
People who needed aid were suspect and, increasingly, feared. As early 
as 1897 H. A. Ames, the Montreal social reformer, had argued that "ordi-
17 INTERIOR, Annual Report, 1903/04, p. 169. 
18 Ibid., p. 170. 
19 Dennis GUEST, The Emergence of Social Security in Canada (Vancouver: Uni-
versity of British Columbia Press, 1980), p. 15. 
20 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
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nary urban conditions are demoralizing and that no portion of the com-
munity can be allowed to deteriorate without danger to the whole". 21 The 
very need for increased social services in the cities was seen as a threat 
to Canadian values. 
The increasing use of deportation reflected the changing character of 
the immigration movement as much as the conservative Canadian values. 
Despite their cited intentions to pursue agricultural occupations, very large 
numbers of immigrants went directly to urban centres. The large Galician 
migration after 1897 brought significant numbers to the city of Winnipeg. 
At the tum of the century the large Jewish and Italian migrations were 
drawn to large urban centres. The smaller migrations of Armenians, Greeks 
and Syrians also followed this pattern. In 1902-3 the British immigration 
increased by 140 percent over the previous year, largely as a result of the 
shift of Canadian recruiting efforts from rural to urban regions. 22 This 
unprecedented influx of non-agricultural immigrants produced great concern 
in a Canadian society which was still steadfastly rural in outlook and ideals. 
While the Immigration Branch was somewhat apprehensive about 
these new urban immigrants, there remained a determination not to restrict 
the long-awaited immigration unduly. The inspections at the ports of entry 
were cursory and medical examinations necessarily short. 23 The Chief 
Medical Officer's report on inspections and rejections at ports of entry 
indicates that part of the explanation for the large number of British de-
portations was due to lax inspections. Of over 50,000 British immigrants 
in 1903-4 only 35 were detained for close inspection, while 150 of 510 
immigrants from the Middle East and 624 of 1,955 Russians were detained. 
A comparison with American inspection of British immigrants shows that 
in the United States one in 235 was rejected while in Canada only one in 
5,027 was refused entry. 24 The medical inspectors were not instructed to 
discriminate against any national group, but such factors as prejudice, 
language difficulties, and the unfamiliar habits and customs of certain 
groups undoubtedly brought them under closer initial scrutiny. The result 
was that there were more rejections of the non-British at ports of entry 
but virtually no deportations, while the reverse was the case for the 
British. 
As this new urban migration increased there was greater opposition 
to the admittance of "undesirable" immigrants. Dr Bryce argued that since 
it was not practical to overcome the weaknesses in the inspection pro-
cedure, "it is desired and expected that medical practitioners and municipal 
officers throughout Canada will notify the department, giving particulars of 
cases", so that deportations can be effected, "rather than allow incorrect 
21 Cited in Terry CoPP, The Anatomy of Poverty : The Condition of the Working 
Class in Montreal, /897-1929 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), p. 15. 
22 INTERIOR, Annual Report, 1902/03, Report of the deputy minister. 
23 Ibid., 1906/07, p. 129. Dr Bryce pointed out that not only did as many as 
7,000 immigrants arrive in a single day, but that no clinical examination was made of anyone 
"not obviously in poor health". Civil examinations -questions relating to education, skills, 
etc. -were left to the discretion of the medical inspector. 
24 INTERIOR, Annual Report, 1903/04, p. 167; 1904/05, p. 119. 
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or exaggerated reports to reach the public press". 25 In Montreal, at least, 
the Immigration Branch had this type of co-operation from the benevolent 
and charitable societies which handled the bulk of the social services in that 
city. For example, on 25 August 1903 the Italian Immigrant Aid Society 
requested the deportation of Rocco di Cintia and Carlo Perusini. Unable 
to make a living, they would soon become public charges because the 
Society could not support them indefinitely. On 8 September the St 
Andrew's Home, Church of England, urged the return of William Hinkley 
because he was "unfit" and would not succeed in Canada. The StGeorge's 
Society of Montreal reported a couple with one child on 12 Septembre, 
a couple with two children on 23 September, and a woman with two children 
on 17 November 1903. The Charity Organization Society requested a de-
portation on 23 September, and in October an agency which placed 
domestic servants suggested deporting a Swedish girl of "bad character". 26 
It is evident that in Winnipeg, and to a lesser extent in Toronto and in 
Saint John, the Immigration Branch received similar referrals.27 
With the increased resort to deportations, the Immigration Branch 
encountered some immigrants who objected to this treatment. The Chief 
Medical Officer was disturbed that some deportations from Canada were 
being successfully challenged in the courts under habeas corpus proceed-
ings. To prevent in Canada "what have proved insurmountable difficulties 
and even social dangers to the cities of the United States", he urged the 
revision of the Immigration Act so as to confirm the use of deportations, 
and further to increase these powers. 28 Discussions about revising the 
thirty-year-old Act began in January 1904, and the deportation provisions 
were high on the agenda. The officials studied the highly restrictive 
American legislation of 1903 which left immigrants liable to deportation for 
three years. The British legislation was also consulted, and it provided 
some basis for the draft bill presented to Clifford Sifton in 1905. On Sifton's 
resignation as minister the matter was delayed until 1906. 
In the House of Commons Frank Oliver, the new minister, contended 
that Bill 170 was merely a codification of the Immigration Act with ''certain 
small amendments''. 29 In fact the Bill proposed a radical amendment of 
the legislation, but in real terms it was not a significant extension of the 
restrictive measures which had been followed since 1902. There were some 
objections voiced, but they amounted to little more than opposition snip-
ing. When explaining the power to deport public charges, Oliver allowed 
that criticism could be justified but circumstances were such that this 
power was necessary. 
25 Ibid., p. 127. 
26 IB, F. 837(5), Italian Immigration Aid Society for Canada to Hoolohan, 25 
August 1903; the Andrews Home to Hoolohan, 8 September 1903; St George's Society 
to Hoolohan, 12, 22 September, 17 November 1903; Hoolohan to Scott, 7 October 1903. 
27 IB, F. 837(5), H. Percy to Scott, 27 January 1904; Lantalum to Scott, 14 Sep-
tember 1903 ; J. 0. Smith, Report, July-September 1903. INTERIOR, Annual Report, 1904/05, 
p. 131. 
28 Ibid., p. 133. 
29 CANADA, PARLIAMENT, House of Commons Debates (hereafter Commons De-
bates), III (1906): 5196. 
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It is a very wide power to give to the government but I think the government 
may be trusted to exercise it with due discretion. There is no doubt that there 
are conditions of pauperism which are as objectionable as crime, or physical, 
or moral infirmity; in fact it is mental infirmity in some cases. 30 
In the Senate, however, there was a spirited attack against these sections 
of Bill 170 from a few members. The reason for this criticism was effec-
tively summarized by one senator: 
I think the country is getting rich, and it is getting inhuman at the same time ... 
any man may come here with the best of health and the best of intentions, 
with a sincere desire to provide for his family, but may suffer misfortune and 
be unable to support himself. Then the country ruthlessly turns him out. 31 
The proponents of the strong deportation powers , on the other hand, 
candidly stated that they did not want a ''permanent burden and nuisance 
in the country'', and amendments to these sections were easily defeated. 
The Liberal leader in the Senate, in his closing statement, argued that this 
"violent action" was not used indiscriminately, but only when it was "in 
the interest of the people in whose locality the unfortunate happens to 
reside.'' 32 If the community did not wish to provide social services to a 
recent immigrant, the Immigration Branch was willing to consider deport-
ing the individual. 
Previous legislation had prohibited immigrants who posed a threat 
to public safety; the criminal and those with dangerous diseases. The 1906 
Act (6 Ed. VII cap. 19) extended the prohibition to include the feeble-
minded, idiotic, epileptic and insane. Also, the deaf and dumb and the 
infirm were required to have assurances of permanent support in Canada, 
as opposed to the former requirement of a guarantee of support for three 
years. A carte blanche clause permitting the exclusion of "any specified 
class" was also inserted to deal with groups, such as gypsies, who were 
undesirable even if they were physically and mentally fit. Deportation 
procedures were clearly outlined. If, within two years of arrival, any im-
migrant "committed a crime involving moral turpitude, or became an in-
mate of a jail or hospital or other charitable institution", it became "the 
duty of the clerk or secretary of the municipality to forthwith notify the 
Minister" so that an investigation could be initiated. The municipality was 
to pay the cost of the deportation, if the immigrant could not do so. 33 
Any decision to reject or deport an immigrant was to be made by a board 
of inquiry, and any ruling could be appealed to the minister. Finally the 
Immigration Branch had the power to meet the demands for deportation 
which were being put to them. 
After the passage of the Immigration Act, copies were sent to all the 
provincial secretaries and provincial medical officers for distribution to the 
30 Ibid. : 5251. 
31 CANADA, PARLIAMENT, Senate Debates , 1906 : 1006. 
32 Ibid. ; 1020. 
33 It seems that municipalities never paid for deportations. The existing practice 
of having the transportation companies return immigrants within one year of their arrival 
became the rule. For anyone who had been in Canada for a longer period the arrangement 
was that the Immigration Branch would pay one-half of the regular fare . See IB, F . 653(5) , 
Oliver to Scott, 11 February 1907. 
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appropriate officials. The Immigration Branch also requested lists of police 
magistrates, clerks of municipalities, wardens of penitentiaries, heads of 
asylums, and directors of other public institutions so that copies of the Act 
could be broadly distributed at the municipal level. Responding to the long-
standing protest from Quebec, a special agent was appointed in 1906 to 
search for undesirables in asylums. 34 Under the new Act the medical 
officers no longer had the burden of implementing this policy, for any im-
migration officer could carry out a deportation. 
The rate of deportation doubled after the passage of the legislation, 
but the pattern remained unchanged. Over eighty percent of the deported 
were British immigrants, and some seventy-five percent of the total, 
excluding accompanying members, were deported on medical grounds. 35 
While the immigrants were being deported from a larger number of centres, 
almost eighty percent still came from Winnipeg, Montreal and Toronto. 36 
For the first time Ontario narrowly edged out the Prairie provinces as the 
major source of deportations. Deportations increased because as the urban, 
industrial society emerged, the demand for social services was not met. 
The issue as to which level of government was responsible for immigrants 
complicated the question, but the root of the problem lay in society's 
determination to perpetuate old values. 
II 
The increase in deportations (Graph 1) was closely related to the 
changing patterns of immigration, and especially to the greatly expanded 
recruitment efforts in Britain. Even Sifton, in early 1904, had noted that 
philanthropic societies in Britain were sending immigrants "who are 
perfectly helpless, that is to say people who neither know how to take care 
of themselves, nor want to do it". 37 He called for an investigation into 
the situation, and for an end to the migration. The deputy minister, how-
ever, took a narrow view of Sifton's complaint and reported that the 
societies with which the government was directly associated brought in 
only desirable immigrants. 38 Sifton did not pursue the question. The as-
sistance to the British philanthropic societies by the Canadian government 
increased, especially after Oliver's appointment as minister in early 1905. 
The economic prosperity of those years readily facilitated the absorption 
of most of these immigrants. Warnings, such as from the Associated 
34 IB, F. 567097, Memorandum, n.d.; F. 653(4), Fortier to provincial secretaries, 
9 August 1906; Fortier to medical health officers, 9 August 1906; Scott to J. Clark, Secretary 
to Minister of Justice, 17 December 1906. 
35 The records of deportation began to be collected in December 1902 by the medical 
officers and were published in the Annual Reports. The statistics used in this paper, unless 
otherwise stated, come from the compiled tables in the reports for the fiscal year 1922-23, 
and for 1939-40. The statistics were presented in three tables - by cause, by nationality, 
by province. 
36 INTERIOR, Annual Report, 1906/07, pp. 132-33. 
37 IB, F. 305578, Sifton to Smart, 25 January 1904. 
38 Ibid., Smart to Sifton, 30 March 1904. 
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Charities of Toronto, concerning the urban congestion created by im-
migrants brought in by the Salvation Army and the Baron Rothschild 
Institute were ignored. 39 The economic depression which started in late 
1907 brought about a rude awakening. 
In October 1907, the St Andrew's Society, StGeorge's Society, and 
other philanthropic and charitable organizations in Toronto met to protest 
against the immigration of people who depended on charity. 40 Oliver 
immediately looked into the allegation and discovered that no less than 
ten societies, exclusive of organizations dealing solely with children, 
assisted British immigrants to come to Canada. Incomplete statistics in-
dicated that since 1 July 1905, these societies claimed to have brought 
17,323 immigrants to Canada. 41 A report on these societies by the London 
office of the Immigration Branch was even more damning. It was found 
that in 1907 seven societies had sent 12,336 immigrants from London, 
largely in an effort to deal with the unemployment problem in that city. 
The Canadian authorities had no supervision over this work which was 
"confined to the destitute, the unfortunate, and to a large extent, the in-
competent". Many, it was concluded, would not become desirable 
citizens. 42 On the basis of this report and on the fact that most of the 
441 British deportees in 1907 had been assisted to Canada, the govern-
ment acted swiftly. Order in Council 410 was passed on 25 February 
1908, prohibiting the landing of any person whose passage had been paid 
to any extent by any charitable organization or public body, unless the 
assistant superintendent in London had inquired into the "antecedents" 
of the person and had approved the migration. 43 
Measures were taken to deal with the immediate problem in Canada. 
In early December 1907 steps were taken to ensure that immigrants had 
sufficient money to provide for themselves until the spring, when it was 
anticipated that the economy would have improved. Also, immigrants were 
warned that if they could not support themselves they would be deported. 44 
The government attempted to find employment for the destitute immigrants 
rather than deport them, but this proved difficult for these immigrants 
constituted about half of all those depending on charity, and many declined 
to accept employment in rural areas. The Superintendent of Immigration 
observed that the main problem lay in the fact the assisted immigrants 
were not good workers and, consequently, were the first to be laid off 
during an economic downturn. 45 Thus, when the Fred Victor Mission 
39 IB, F. 286736, Associated Charities of Toronto to Oliver, 12 January 1906. 
40 Ibid., J. B. Walker to Scott, 29 October 1907. 
41 IB, F. 752538(1), Scott to Oliver, 9 December 1907. 
42 Ibid., Walker, London, to Scott, 10 January 1908. 
43 Ibid., Scott to J. 0. Smith, London, 9 March 1908 ; Scott to Smith, l3 April 
1908; Scott to Smith, l3 May 1909. These provisions were not strictly enforced, and they 
did not affect work by organizations such as the Salvation Army which loaned passage 
money at the current interest rate. 
44 IB, 745162MQ, Oliver to Walker, London, 3 December 1907; Scott to steamship 
lines, 6 December 1907; Scott to J. V. Lantalum, Saint John, 9 December 1907 ; Oliver 
to Walker, 11 December 1907. P.C. 28, Order in Council, 8 January 1908, established 
that immigrants required a minimum amount of money on landing. 
45 IB, F. 752538(1). Scott to Walker, 14 December 1907. 
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Society in Toronto complained that it encountered too many "incapable 
and undesirable immigrants" who found life in Canada too strenuous, 
the superintendent promptly sent a supply of blank deportation forms to 
the Mission and requested that they be completed in triplicate. 46 As the 
economic depression worsened in the summer of 1908, a special agent was 
sent to Toronto with "a good supply" of deportation forms and with the 
advice that they be used "where deportation seems desirable". 47 In June 
1908, the Immigration Act was printed in pamphlet form to facilitate wider 
distribution. The introduction noted that it was intended to provide 
magistrates, clerks of municipalities and the general public with informa-
tion about the Act, and with "directions for bringing about the deporta-
tion of 'undesirables"'. 48 As The Canadian Annual Review noted, "the 
crowded towns and heavily-taxed charities spoke forcibly" on the immigra-
tion question. 49 
When the depression persisted beyond the short seasonal downturn 
which was accepted as normal, the Immigration Branch gave in to the 
demands of the social agencies and provincial governments and relieved 
them of some of their burdens through deportations. The deportations rose 
to 1,748 in the fiscal year 1908-9, a number greater than the total since 
1900. The depression of 1907-8 set a new pattern for deportations . There 
was a dramatic shift from deportation for medical reasons to such civil 
reasons as public charge, criminality and "bad character". In the pre-
depression years medical causes had accounted for over 70 percent of the 
deportations. This slipped to 33 percent during the depression and con-
tinued to decline further in later years. The public-charge category, rising 
from 17 percent of the total in the earlier years to 54 percent during the 
depression, became the most important single reason for deportation, and 
remained so in the following years. Deportation under other civil causes 
rose from 5 to over 11 percent of the 1907-9 total. As well the deporta-
tions involved more nationalities, with some thirty-five represented during 
the depression as opposed to twenty-one up to that period. 50 There was 
also a significant geographical trend. Ontario contributed a full 50 percent 
of the deportations, and Quebec followed with 30 percent. An analysis of 
279 public-charge deportations for 1907-8 indicates that 57 percent origi-
nated· in Ontario. 51 Such deportees came not only from Toronto (97), 
but also from smaller centres such as Chatham (25), Oshawa (21), Ottawa 
(7) and Peterborough (5). The urban centres of central Canada were unable, 
or unwilling, to cope with the responsibilities of providing social services 
during prolonged periods of unemployment. 
46 Ibid ., Fred Victor Mission to W. W. Cory, 27 November 1907; Scott to Mis-
sion , 30 November 1907. 
47 IB, F. 286736, Scott to E. B. Robertson, 12 June 1908. 
48 CANADA. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, Th e Law and Regulations of Canada 
Respecting Immigration and Immigrants (Ottawa, 1908). 
49 J . C. HOPKINS, Th e Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1908 (Toronto: 
Canadian Annual Review Publishing Co., 1909), p. 116. 
50 INTERIOR, Annual Report, 1907/08, pp. 131-35. 
51 Ibid. 
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Public charges did not account for all the deportations. Some im-
migrants simply wanted to return to their former homes. In one case, a 
British immigrant who had been unemployed for almost a year wished to 
be deported because he had an offer of employment in London, but lacked 
the funds for passage for himself and his family. They were deported with 
the immigrant agreeing to reimburse the government for the passage. 52 
Also a greater intolerance, perhaps an insecurity, had developed in the 
new urban, industrial society. Suddenly there was a dramatic increase in 
deportations for criminal causes. The Chief Medical Officer was very frank 
in explaining this trend : 
Whenever there has been a depression in business and a lack of employment, 
there is an increase in criminal returns , part of it being due to the fact that 
many vagrants and others have charges preferred against them in order that 
they may be taken charge of. 53 
The deportation of "bad characters" also rose noticeably. During the un-
employment crisis in Vancouver, a moralistically inspired crack-down on 
the red-light district brought some American-born prostitutes under investi-
gation by the Immigration Branch. Fourteen women were deported and, 
apparently, a further sixty-five decided to leave the city on their own. 54 
Concern for morality was also evident in the deportation of fourteen British 
mechanics living in Montreal. They had come to Canada as strike-breakers 
for the Canadian Pacific Railway in September and October 1908. Later 
in the year they were convicted to ten days in jail for drunkenness. Since 
their employment had been terminated for that same reason they were 
deported. 55 
The numerous problems with "undesirables" led the Immigration 
Branch to seek an amendment of the Act so as to restrict further the entry 
of certain types of immigrants, and to extend the powers concerning 
deportation. In the fall of 1908 a review was begun and Bill 17 was 
presented in January 1909. In the House of Commons Oliver stated that 
circumstances had changed since 1906 and that "more and more restric-
tion or more and more careful selection" was essential. 56 With the end of 
the depression in sight, the amendment was not vigorously pressed and the 
session ended before the debate was completed. The amendment was 
resubmitted in January 1910 as Bill 102. The proposed restrictions related 
to prostitutes, pimps, professional beggars or vagrants, and to charity-
aided immigrants. Those advocating the overthrow, by force or violence, 
of the government or constituted law and authority could be deported. 
The proposal to extend the time limit within which deportation could be 
effected to three years was criticized by the opposition as being too short. 
Much of the pressure for greater deportation powers was based on a report 
from Ontario which argued that the number of immigrants in the various 
public institutions was disproportionate to their percentage of the popula-
52 IB, F. 805495, Memorandum, n.d. ; J. 0. Smith to Scott, 30 June 1909. 
53 INTERIOR, Annual Report, 1908/09, p. 109. 
54 IB, F . 741425, A. S. Monro to Scott, 12 February 1908. 
55 IB, F. 804560, J . Hoolahan to Scott, 14 October 1908. 
56 Commons Debates, I (1909): 2009. 
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tion, and that the financial burden of maintaining immigrants in such insti-
tutions was excessive. 57 Oliver felt that the extended powers granted in 
the amendment were sufficient to deal with the existing problems and he 
refused to entertain stronger provisions. The Senate accepted Bill 102 as 
it was presented. The revised Act (9, 10 Ed. VII cap. 27) reflected the 
fact that Canadians were becoming more and more selective about who 
could be admitted and more discriminating about who fit into Canadian 
SOCiety. 
During the period of economic prosperity which followed the reces-
sion of 1907-8, there was a sharp decline in the number of deportations, 
but there was not a return to the pre-1907 rate. Deportations had become 
acceptable and were carried out at a rate of over 750 a year. By 1911 
the great upsurge in immigration was reflected in a slight increase in the 
number of deportations. During the five years from April 1909 to March 
1914, Canada received 1,575,495 immigrants - more than had arrived in 
the preceding twenty years. Economic prosperity based on continued 
agricultural settlement, industrial expansion, resource development and 
railway construction enabled the flood of immigrants to be absorbed. 
Although deportations of public charges continued to constitute the single 
largest category, they declined steadily as a percentage of the total 
deportations and remained relatively constant in real numbers. Deportation 
of criminals was rising rapidly during the period, and there was a small 
increase in the number of deportations for medical causes. Prosperity, 
combined with an appreciation of the value of immigrant labour, con-
tributed to a more tolerant attitude towards immigrants encountering 
temporary economic setbacks. At the same time, there was a hardening 
of the attitudes towards those who transgressed the law. Convicted cri-
minals and individuals who offended the moral values of the community 
increasingly found themselves subject to deportation. 
In early 1913 another more serious financial crisis hit Canada. 
Deportations of immigrants living in Alberta and Manitoba rose dramati-
cally, while in British Columbia and in the Maritime Provinces they 
doubled. As the crisis deepened, the industrial centres of central Canada 
experienced severe unemployment. An increase in deportations followed. 
Although the deportations rose to a level equal to that of the earlier 
depression, it seems that a less reactionary policy was followed. The 
deportation of public charges was double that of the years of prosperity, 
but remained thirty percent less than in 1908-9. This, despite the fact that 
there was a vastly larger group of potential deportees because of increased 
immigration and of the longer period within which deportation was pos-
sible. This time the immigration officials made a greater effort to find 
employment for the unemployed, especially in agriculture. The railways 
co-operated by providing reduced rates for farm labourers in Western 
Canada. 58 Deportation, as a quick solution to the problem of unemploy-
57 Ibid., III (1910): 5519-22. 
58 INTERIOR, Annual Report, 1913/14, p. 142 ; 1914/15, p. 90; IB, F. 29490(3), 
memorandum by E. B. Robertson, 17 July 1914; Scott to railway companies, 21 July 1914. 
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ment, was less apparent than in 1907-9. It is evident that, to some extent, 
the Immigration Branch saw the financial crisis as responsible for the 
unemployment and, consequently, was not rigid in enforcing the regula-
tions. The absence of a large problem group such as the assisted immigrants 
during the previous crisis also contributed to this change in attitude. 
Low immigration and full employment by 1916 brought about a sharp 
decline in deportations which lasted for the remainder of World War I. 
During this period fifty percent of the deportations were for criminal 
causes and only twenty-two percent were of public charges. Since much 
of the wartime immigration was from the United States, sixty-three percent 
of the deported were American citizens. 
A number of the "crimes" for which people were deported were 
"incidental to times of war". 59 This referred to such things as being 
"pro-German", anti-war, and evading the United States draft. Among 
these there were some deportations of individuals who were perceived as 
attempting to disrupt the war effort through labour activities. The position 
of the government was clearly outlined in a response to complaints from 
lumber interests on the Pacific Coast. 
The fact that a man belongs to the IWW [International Workers of the World] 
is not in itself sufficient to absolutely debar his entry to this country and of 
course it could not be sufficient to bring about his deportation. However, there 
are usually other features connected with the majority of these cases which 
enable us to deal with them and you may rest assured that the Department 
is alive to the importance of the situation. 60 
There is no evidence that any large number of IWW organizers were 
deported from British Columbia, but some investigations were carried 
out. In 1918 a major effort was made to investigate an organizer who 
had conducted two strikes in the Prince George district - "his scheme 
being six hours a day". 61 It was discovered that he had entered Canada 
surreptitiously via a mountain trail at Nelson and, therefore, he was 
deported for illegal entry. Since he was also avoiding the United States 
draft, the authorities were notified and he was arrested on his re-entry. 
The IWW also made some attempts to organize the harvesters in Western 
Canada during 1917. Five Americans who started a strike at Yorkton were 
arrested and convicted by the local authorities. The Immigration Branch 
complied with the request that they be deported after they served their 
thirty-day terms in the Regina Gaol. 62 A reguest, in 1918, by the 
Department of Justice that IWW officials in British Columbia be deported 
as public charges was turned down by the Immigration Branch. 63 The 
Immigration Branch was willing to comply with requests to deport un-
desirables who seemed to be undermining the war effort, but the powers 
of deportation, while broad and discretionary, did have limits which were 
observed by the officials in charge. 
59 INTERIOR, Annual Report, 1918/19, p. 22. 
60 IB, F. 917093(1), Scott to Harvey, eta!, Solicitors, Cranbrook, 12 May 1917. 
61 Ibid., Reid to Scott, 9 April 1918. 
62 Ibid., Walker to Scott, 11 October 1917. 
63 Ibid., Scott to E. L. Newcombe, 6 September 1918. 
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III 
In the aftermath of World War I the Canadian government turned its 
attention to the future of the nation. In April 1919 a lengthy amendment 
to the Immigration Act was presented. The minister, J. A. Calder, argued 
that many mistakes had been made in the past and that a new immigra-
tion policy was needed. The problem, as he saw it, was that too many 
immigrants had not been assimilated into the Canadian community. This 
was attributed to the negligence of former governments in educating the 
immigrants in the responsibilities of citizenship and to the fact that some 
of the immigrants were not readily assimilable. 64 Calder, however, did not 
propose an end to immigration for he subscribed to the popular theory 
that an increased population would solve the national debt problem, and 
provide both traffic for the beleaguered railway systems and a home market 
for the industrial concerns. 
Much of the debate on Bill 52 was highly partisan, focusing on the 
apparent failure of the "foreign" immigrants to contribute a fair share 
to the war effort. 65 All the proposals further to restrict immigration and 
to broaden the powers of deportation were accepted by Parliament. The 
major change was to extend to five years the time-limit within which 
an immigrant could be deported. No time-limit was placed on the 
deportation of immigrants who at the time of entry belonged to any of the 
prohibited classes, because their entry was by "false representations". 
On 9 May the minister proposed the inclusion of a new clause to 
the amendment. He wanted to strengthen Section 41 of the 1910 Act 
which dealt with revolutionaries, anarchists and terrorists. The new 
amendment would give him the power to deport any person who advocated 
or taught the unlawful destruction of property, or who was "a member 
or affiliated with any organization entertaining or teaching disbelief in or 
opposition to organized government". It was also specified that such 
individuals could not acquire domicile. 66 This had the effect of making 
every radical not born in Canada liable to deportation. By 4 June the 
revised Bill 52 had received approval from both Houses of Parliament. 
At this point, legal advisers from the Department of Justice informed 
Calder that Section 41 was not precise and suggested that it be rewritten. 
Since Bill 52 was beyond the stage where amendment was possible, a new 
bill was presented to the House of Commons on 6 June. 67 Minor changes, 
such as substituting "by word or act" for "advocates", were made. The 
untenable attempt arbitrarily to deny domicile was replaced by a clause 
granting immunity from deportation to any immigrant who had become a 
naturalized Canadian citizen. 68 An addition was made by including a clause 
64 Commons Debates, II (1919): 1866-69. 
65 Ibid. : 1910-29. 
66 Ibid. , III (1919) : 2283-86. 
67 Ibid., IV (1919): 3212-13. 
68 A Canadian citizen could not be deported, but the Department of Justice, under 
the Naturalization Act, could revoke the naturalization of a foreign-born person. Deportation, 
however, could be effected only if the country of birth still recognized the individual as a 
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referring to assuming powers of government without lawful authority. A 
subsection declared that anyone who had been a prohibited immigrant 
at any time since the passage of the Act in 1910 was assumed still to be 
so. The burden of disproving such a charge rested on the accused. Unani-
mous consent was given for the introduction of Bill 132, and it was 
passed with minimal debate. The Senate rubber-stamped the rewritten 
Section 41 so as to permit it to receive royal assent during the session 
which had been previously scheduled for that afternoon. 69 
The government definitely had the Winnipeg General Strike in mind 
when clarifying Section 41, but the amendment was not the product of 
a frantic panic. Most of the section had been in place since 1910, and 
the substantive amendments were inserted on 9 May, a week before the 
strike started. 
The changes to Section 41 had arisen out of the conditions during 
the latter part of the war. The rising social discontent in Canada had been 
blamed on the "alien enemy" and, increasingly, on a Bolshevist conspiracy. 
In September 1918 action had been taken under the War Measures Act 
to increase censorship and to declare illegal a number of socialist 
organizations. 70 This action had increased the possibility of using the 
powers of deportation because immigrants could be deported upon convic-
tion for any of the new offences. However, with the three-year limit 
of the 1910 Act, few had come within the reach of deportation. In early 
1919 the Manitoba government had established the Alien Enemy Investi-
gation Board so as to issue identity cards to loyal aliens. There was some 
desire on the part of this board to deport immigrants who had been dis-
loyal, but the Immigration Branch did not transfer any power to this 
provincial body. 71 In Toronto, a move against radicals had resulted in the 
arrest of Leon Samson and Elise Saborowski. Both were ordered deported. 
Samson, "a Russian revolutionist" but an American citizen, was returned 
to the United States on 25 May 1919. This, against the wishes of the 
Department of Justice which "was anxious that this man should be deported 
to Siberia where he would no doubt have been executed under the regime 
of Admiral Kolchak". 72 Saborowski, a German citizen and "a member of 
the communist party and a revolutionist of a pronounced type", could 
not be deported because relations with Germany were non-existent. She 
was transferred to the internment camp at Vernon, B.C., and repatriated 
to Germany as a prisoner of war on 27 February 1920. 73 
The prolonged general strike in Winnipeg created a minor "red 
scare". The Borden Government decided to take a direct part in the 
citizen. The USSR, for example, accepted few deportees because it did not recognize the 
individuals as citizens. See IB , F. 906924(1) and 906924(2) . 
69 The two immigration bills received assent along with sixty-eight other bills. 
70 P.C. 2384, Order in Council, 25 September 1918. 
71 PAC, RCMP Papers (hereafter RCMP), Vol. 2168, F. 15, R. J. Mansfield to 
Minister of Militia, 26 February 1919. 
12 IB, F. 961162, W. R. Little to Calder, 5 August 1919 ; F. C. Blair to Ireland, 
27 April 1920. 
13 Ibid. 
424 HISTOIRE SOCIALE - SOCIAL HISTORY 
negotiation of a settlement and to deport the radical elements. 74 The 
Minister of Labour, Senator Gideon Robertson, was sent to Winnipeg to 
carry out the decision. To facilitate the deportations eleven senior officers 
of the Royal North West Mounted Police in Western Canada (RNWMP) 
were appointed as immigration officers on 16 June. These officers, 
thereby , had the power to detain and examine immigrants under Section 
42 of the Immigration Act. This power, however, could only be obtained 
from the Minister of Immigration after he had received the names and 
full details as prescribed by Section 41. The RNWMP, unaware of this 
limitation, immediately decided that "all undesirables shall be interned and 
deported' ' in a massive campaign which would be timed to coincide with 
the Winnipeg arrests. 75 Senator Robertson was told by Calder on 16 June: 
"In case arrests are to be made have wire sent me giving names and 
particulars so that necessary order may issue". 76 As far as the Immigration 
Branch was concerned the regulations were to be respected. 
The entire situation was bungled. Not only were the arrests con-
ducted in the early hours of 17 June illegal under the Immigration Act, 
but the sudden action in Winnipeg resulted in the stillbirth of the RNWMP 
anti-radical campaign. The six Anglo-Saxon strike leaders were charged 
with seditious conspiracy under the criminal code and were released on 
bail. Four of the five "aliens" were held under the Immigration Act for 
examination as to whether they had entered Canada legally. Represented 
by three lawyers, they came before boards of inquiry in July and August 
in Winnipeg. Solomon Almazoff was acquitted, while Michael Charitinoff 
and Samuel Blumenburg were ordered deported, but their appeals were 
sustained. Only the American-hom Oscar Schoppelrie was deported be-
cause he had entered Canada illegally. 77 Significantly, Schoppelrie had 
played only a minor role in the radical movement, while the three who 
were released had been major figures in the radical movement among 
Winnipeg' s foreign-born. 
On 21 June, "Bloody Saturday" , a riot in downtown Winnipeg led 
to the arrest of over one hundred people. Thirty-one " alien" rioters were 
brought before Magistrate Sir Hugh J. Macdonald ; most were fined or 
given short sentences. Macdonald further recommended that some of the 
"alien enemy" be interned and deported. Colonel Starnes of the RNWMP 
ordered the internment of twelve of these men under the Alien Enemies 
Act. Later he stated that at the time he had felt it to be "imperative 
that an example should be made of some of these aliens". 78 These men 
were sent to the internment camp at Kapuskasing, Ontario, in early July. 
An appeal was launched on their behalf by the Winnipeg Trades and Labor 
Council, and the case was brought under review by the Department of 
74 RCMP, Vol. 578, F. 333, N. Rowell to A. A. Mclean, 14 June 1919. 
15 RCMP, Vol. 2172, F. 22/4, Scott to A. B. Perry, Commissioner, Regina, 16 
June 1919 ; Circular 71, Regina, 16 June 1919. This circular was cancelled on 20 June 1919. 
76 IB, F. 961162(1) , Calder to Robertson, 16 June 1919. 
77 RCMP, Vol. 3314, F. 4, 5, 6, transcripts of Board of Inquiry. 
78 PAC, Department of Justice Records, Vol. 239, F. 1960, Starnes to Com-
missioner, RNWMP, 16 December 1919. 
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Justice in late October. 79 Meanwhile, Major-General Otter, who was in 
charge of the internment operations, had finally arranged for the repatria-
tion of the prisoners of war held at Kapuskasing. On his own authority 
he released two of these men because they had dependent families in 
Canada. The remaining ten were repatriated in a routine manner as pri-
soners of war. 80 A serious mistake had been made. The Department of 
Justice investigated the circumstances surrounding this repatriation, but 
decided not to question the actions of any of the government officials. 
The RNWMP did not revive their plan to mount a national anti-
radical campaign, but some individual arrests were made in the summer 
of 1919 under Section 41. Only a few led to deportation. The number 
of detentions was low because the Immigration Branch required credible 
evidence, particularly evidence on employment history "to disclose 
whether the alien is a bona fide worker or an agitator". 81 
The sudden rise of the One Big Union in Western Canada, accom-
panied by radical rhetoric and violent labour disputes in Alberta and B.C., 
led to some deportations. Romeo Albo was arrested under Section 41 at 
Lethbridge with a minister's order on 25 July 1919. He was ordered 
deported to Italy. An appeal was dismissed, but before his deportation 
could be arranged he died in hospital. 82 Anna Kannasto, an organizer for 
the Finnish Socialist Democratic Party in Alberta, was ordered deported 
on the grounds of having entered Canada by misrepresentation. She 
appealed the ruling, and was still in Canada in April 1920. 83 An Austrian 
noted for his strong sympathy for the One Big Union was convicted of 
possessing firearms and, consequently, was considered for deportation. It 
was decided not to press the case for he was "not one of the leading 
agitators, due doubtless to his lack of brains". 84 There is no evidence 
that the leading members of the One Big Union were deported or even 
detained for investigation under the Immigration Act. 
One group which was persecuted under the Immigration Act was 
the Union of Russian Workers. Starting in July 1919, a series of arrests 
netted twenty-one Russian-born in British Columbia. Boards of inquiry 
ordered the deportation of fourteen. In October they were sent to the 
internment camp at Vernon, so as to be isolated from their friends and 
supporters. The Immigration Branch also found it more economical to 
detain them at Vernon than elsewhere. 85 Attempts to have them deported 
were futile as the Russian consul at Montreal would not consider their 
return, and the Canadian government had no relations with the Soviet 
government. When the camp at Vernon was closed in late February 1920, 
79 Ibid., Comptroller, RNWMP, to Deputy Minister of Justice, 29 October 1919. 
80 Ibid., Otter to Deputy Minister of Justice, 8 November 1919 ; Otter to Deputy 
Minister, 15 November 1919. 
81 IB, F. 96ll62(l), Scott to all officers, 17 June 1919. 
82 Ibid., Blair to Gibson , 17 July 1919; Blair to Ireland, 27 April 1920. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid., Blair to [illegible], 18 December 1919. 
85 RCMP, Vol. 1931, F. 2/4, Vancouver, Monthly Reports; IB, F. 906924(1), 
Memorandum, 1920; Blair to L. Pacaud, ll February 1923. 
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one of these radicals was released on parole and the others were lodged 
in the penitentiary at New Westminster. Hope that these people could be 
returned via normal channels was abandoned and the possibility of simply 
dumping them on Russian territory was explored. The United States was 
contacted to see if another shipload of "reds" such as that carried by the 
S .S. Buford in December 1919 was being dispatched to Europe. A nega-
tive response led to a second attempt to get Japanese approval for 
sending them to Vladivostok. 86 Protests that they would be executed 
if sent to that destination convinced the government, in July, to ask 
whether Britain could arrange their return. Soviet-British relations were 
tense and negotiations proceeded slowly. Concern about having these men 
on their hands indefinitely led the Immigration Branch to release them on 
parole in early December 1920. 87 It does not appear that they were deported 
at a later date. This incident typified the success with which Canada 
deported "radical agitators" during the "red scare" of 1919. The number 
actually intended for deportation by the Immigration Branch was very 
small and often the lack of evidence, or external factors, prevented even 
these deportations from being carried out. 88 
Changed social conditions after World War I, and not the "red scare", 
were responsible for the significant increase in deportations during the 
1920s. During the war the need to assist soldiers' families and returned 
soldiers had exceeded the capacity of voluntary agencies and was increas-
ingly shifted onto the government. This established precedents and to 
some extent also "accustomed the public, both recipient and donor, to 
think in terms of government responsibility for social services''. 89 During 
the recession of 1920-21 the federal government, for the first time, gave 
direct grants to the provinces for public works and relief. With economic 
recovery in 1923, the aid dwindled despite the increasing need for social 
services in the urban, industrial society. In 1926 the public welfare 
expenditures of all levels of government were only 12.5 percent of total 
expenditures, the same proportion as in 18% and significantly less than 
had been allocated in 1913. 90 Social services had a very low priority in 
a decade which is noted for its prosperity. Consequently, municipalities 
and public institutions felt compelled to request deportations to reduce the 
costs of outside relief, overcrowded asylums and overburdened hospital 
wards. 
86 IB, F. 969713, Blair to John Clark, United States Consul, 10 February 1920 ; 
Blair to Calder, 10 February 1920; Clark to Blair, 19 February 1920 ; Scott to Calder, 
25 February 1920. 
87 PAC, Governor-General's Papers, Vol. G21, F. 34691, Walker, Acting Under-
Secretary for External Affairs to Governor-General's Secretary, 31 July 1920; Devon to 
Milner, 7 December 1920. 
88 It has been stated that some 200 radicals were held for deportation by the 
Immigration Branch in 1919, and it is implied that with the help of the United States 
they were deported. (AVERY, 'Dangerous Foreigners', p. 87) No evidence was given for this 
claim. Perhaps twenty to thirty were held for investigation by the Immigration Branch, 
and not more than a handful were deported. 
89 R. C. BROWN and R. CooK, Canada, 1896-/921: A Nation Transformed (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1974), pp. 222-23 . 
90 GUEST, Social Security, pp. 65-70, 102. 
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With the resumption of large-scale immigration from Great Britain 
in 1919 and from continental Europe in 1920, the deportations increased. 
Throughout the 1920s deportations ranged from 1,500 to 2,000 a year. This 
rate was double that of the period from 1910 to 1913, but the causes for 
the deportations were essentially the same. An unchanged deportation 
policy had created an established pattern. During the first half of the 
decade, public-charge deportations accounted for nearly forty percent of 
the total, but fell to twenty-five percent during the boom of the latter years. 
The deportations for medical causes rose steadily during the 1920s. The 
British continued to be deported disproportionately to their immigration, 
as were the Americans in the first half of the decade. In the latter part 
of the 1920s, as British and American immigration fell to just half of the 
total, the deportations of other nationals rose to nearly thirty percent. 
The majority of the immigrants during this decade were seeking non-
agricultural wage employment and were very easily reduced to seeking 
social services if unemployed or disabled through accident or illness. 
IV 
The reluctance to provide social services was deeply rooted, but 
the realities of the Great Depression forced some loosening of the purse 
strings, and some reconsideration of the constitutional strait-jacket. The 
burden of social services was increasingly assumed by the senior levels 
of government; total public welfare expenditures by all government levels 
rose from 99 millions in 1926-27 to 230 in 1933-34 and to 317 in 1939-40. 91 
This tremendous increase in spending on public assistance and on 
social services in general, did not, however, represent any significant 
change in the attitude of the government towards social services. The 
economic depression was so severe that government programmes were 
"all but submerged by the need to provide a subsistence living for 
thousands of unemployed Canadians", leaving little time to experiment 
with new ideas. 92 There was no change in the manner in which dependent 
immigrants were dealt with. 
Deportations were resorted to in an unprecedented way. There were 
28,097 between April 1929 and March 1935, an average annual rate 220 
percent higher than during the preceding five years. Public-charge depor-
tations were over 500 percent higher; criminal deportations rose by 50 
percent; those for other civil causes by 25 percent, while the deportations 
.for medical causes rose by less than 2 percent. In all, over 61 percent 
of the deportations were of public charges. These deportations represented 
3 percent of the 900,000 immigrants who arrived in Canada between 1925 
and 1935. 
A sharp increase in deportations occurred in August 1929 as an 
economic recession coincided with a large immigration. These deportations, 
· 9t Ibid., pp. 86, 206. 
92 Ibid., pp. 84-85, 95. 
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largely of public charges, amounted to an almost wholesale deportation 
of the destitute unemployed by the Liberal government of Mackenzie King. 
It was considered to be an expedient solution to a temporary problem. 
In view of the unemployment situation in the West, it was advisable to effect 
the deportation of persons in Canada without domicile who became public 
charges thus , in some measure, helping to relieve the conditions ... the majority 
of them covering Britishers .... The extent to which these people became public 
charges was not large but in the majority of cases the men were not willing 
to accept farm work, could not obtain industrial work in the cities and were, 
as a matter of fact, looking for a chance to return to the British Isles. 93 
Most of these men had come to Canada as harvesters, and were handled 
in the same manner as a number of earlier ill-fated immigrants. 94 During 
the spring and early summer of 1930 there was a decline in the depor-
tations ; by July they rose again and by October they were at the level 
of the previous fall. 
The new Conservative government of R. B. Bennett faced a serious 
unemployment problem when it assumed office in August 1930. W. A. 
Gordon, the Minister of Immigration, was firmly convinced that the immi-
gration policy of the previous administration had been reckless and 
irresponsible. For him it was "clear, therefore, beyond peradventure 
that either substantial numbers of immigrants who have recently arrived 
in Canada are in the ranks of the unemployed, or conversely, they have 
displaced Canadians who are now unemployed". 95 The Minister of Labour, 
Senator G. Robertson, was even less charitable towards the immigrants. 
In reference to the situation in Northern Ontario, he wrote that "Russian 
and other European people who have only been in this country for a 
short time ... should not be allowed to work ... while hundreds of Canadians 
are standing in the bread line." 96 In the spring of 1931 the ever-attentive 
Assistant Deputy Minister of Immigration, F. C. Blair, put forward a 
proposal for the voluntary repatriation of unemployed continental Euro-
peans. Not only would Canada be better off without them, but it would be 
cheaper than a second season of winter relief. Gordon approved the 
principle, as did the consul-generals of a number of European countries. 97 
Blair had a full plan developed by early July. The initial programme 
was not to be publicized, but was to be limited to referrals by the consul-
general. The repatriation would only occur from Montreal, thereby saving 
on rail fares from inland points. It was estimated that each case would 
cost the federal government $30, far less than the cost of a similar pro-
gramme in the United States. It was also anticipated that eventually the 
Department of National Defence would be needed to help control the 
expected congestion in Montreal. 
93 IB, F. 563236(14), Memorandum for the Minister, 18 August 1930. 
94 IB, F. 907095, File on British harvesters arriving in 1923, and subsequently 
deported. 
95 PAC, Bennett Papers, Vol. 364, Gordon to E. Beatty, n.d. [October 1930]. 
96 IB, F. 563236(14), Robertson to Rev . W. B. Williston, Cochrane, 21 July 1931. 
97 IB, F . 500761, Blair to Gordon, 22 April 1931; Memorandum by Blair, 19 June 
1931. 
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Once the burdened municipalities hear of the scheme they will not be slow in 
urging their unemployed to shuffle along in the direction of Montreal. The 
news will then spread like prairie fire and the unemployed Continentals of 
Canada desirous of returning to their native country will descend on the City 
of Montreal like the locusts of Egypt. 98 
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This scenario did not materialize for on 6 July the minister suspended 
the plan. 
The proposal was never adopted despite pressure from various 
quarters. The Montreal press had printed rumours about this repatriatio 
and by the end of July the Montreal immigration office was daily receiving 
large numbers of applications for deportation. Argument by Blair that these 
men were not needed, that they were the ''fertile soil of Communist propa-
ganda'', that they were not agriculturalists as many of them had claimed on 
arrival and that many wanted to return, failed to persuade the minister 
to launch even a limited repatriation of 10,000 men. 99 The business-
oriented Bennett Government had concluded that the depression was 
temporary and the labour of these immigrants would soon be needed in 
Canada. Instead of mass deportations of the unemployed foreign-born, the 
government gave increased assistance through the Unemployment and 
Farm Relief Act of 1931. The provinces were provided with grants to 
establish work camps for the single unemployed. In 1932 the camps were 
put under the supervision of the Department of National Defence. 
Unlike in the pre-World War I period, it was not necessary to inform 
the local governments of their right to issue complaints about immigrants. 
The Immigration Branch was deluged with requests for deportations and 
found it difficult not to comply. The Relief Board of Alberta, for example, 
kept a central list of individuals on relief from as early as 1926 and actively 
sought the deportation of "repeaters and trouble-makers". 100 In the fall 
of 1930 Alberta complained that the deportation procedures were too slow 
to meet its needs. Twice an immigration officer was sent from Winnipeg 
to investigate, but on both occasions it was found that there was lack of 
evidence to support deportation orders. In June 1931 the supervisor of the 
Relief Branch again called for action on the grounds that the "peace and 
right of the Canadian tax-payers should be considered" . 101 This time 
those on relief were requested to accept available employment, and lists 
were kept of those who refused. It appears that this strategy worked as 
the increase in deportations was higher than in the neighbouring provinces. 
While Alberta was anxious both to rid itself of its Eastern European 
immigrants and to reduce relief costs, Winnipeg was primarily concerned 
. with the latter objective. One Manitoba politician was said to have boasted 
about the ingenuity of that city's policy. 
98 Ibid., T. Magladery to Blair, 17 July 1931. 
99 Ibid., Blair to Gordon, 15 August 1931; Blair to Gordon. 28 August 1931. 
100 Alberta Provincial Archives, Alberta Employment Service, F. 14, List of Men 
on Relief in Alberta, 1926-1931. 
101 Alberta Provincial Archives, Alberta Employment Service, F. 12, Memorandum, 
26 June 1931; Premiers' Papers, F. 501, A. A. Mackenzie to G. B. Henwood, 17 June 1931. 
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Table 1. -CLASSIFICATION OF DEPORTATION WoRK DURING THE CALENDAR YEARS 1932-1933. 
No Action Deportation Deportation Voluntary Deportation Cases Pending 
Class of Deportees* Complaints Taken not Ordered Effected Departure Suspended Death Disappeared Cases 
II: 
BRITISH 
-Cll 
Pub)ic Charge 7,357 679 42 5,659 14 837 2 55 69 >-3 0 Criminal 891 177 12 594 2 61 0 13 32 
-Medical 473 67 7 339 3 39 4 6 8 ~ 
Other 199 16 4 140 4 30 0 4 1 Cll 
Total 8,920 939 65 6,732 23 %7 6 78 110 0 (j 
-OTHERS > 
Public Charge 7,411 1,769 37 3,099 39 1,716 7 401 343 t""' 1:!1 
Medical 2,160 686 28 899 29 366 3 47 102 I Criminal 894 140 11 537 11 77 22 19 77 Cll 
Other 810 133 12 388 55 176 2 9 35 0 
Total 11,275 2,728 88 4,923 134 2,335 34 476 557 (j > TOTAL t""' 
Public Charge 14,768 2,448 79 8,758 53 2,553 9 456 412 II: 
Medical 3,051 863 40 1,493 31 427 3 60 134 (;) >-3 Criminal 1,367 207 18 876 14 116 26 25 85 0 
Other 1,009 149 16 528 59 206 2 13 36 ~ 
GRAND TOTAL 20,195 3,667 153 11,655 157 3,302 40 554 667 
Source: PAC, RG 76, F. 563236(18), Statistical tables, n.d. 
* There were 854 persons accompanying the British deportees, 276, the others, for a total of 1,130. 
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In our town when those foreigners from across the tracks apply for relief 
we just show them a blank application for voluntary deportation. Believe 
me, they don't come back. It's simple, but it has saved the city a lot of 
money.toz 
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The Immigration Branch was aware of the practice but did not inter-
fere. In late 1932 pressure by Winnipeg's two daily newspapers brought 
an end to the use of this form. It was not until December 1933, however, 
that Winnipeg's City Council resolved to oppose the deportation of immi-
grants who were "on relief with no charge against them than being the 
recipients of unemployment relief'. 103 Immediately the number of deporta-
tions fell off dramatically. 
The Immigration Branch did not deport all those against whom com-
plaints were lodged. As shown in Table 1, during 1932 and 1933 some 
nineteen percent of the complaints were dismissed either immediately 
or during a board of inquiry. Over sixteen percent had their deportations 
suspended on the understanding that they would secure employment or 
obtain financial support from friends or relatives. Almost three percent 
decided to stay in Canada by evading the immigration officials. Another 
one percent of those reported for deportation had sufficient funds to leave 
Canada on their own. An interesting feature of these complaints is that 
although the majority were lodged against non-British immigrants, the 
majority of the deportees were British. A large number of spurious com-
plaints were lodged against the non-British by the municipalities. Many of 
these deportations were suspended because, although temporarily 
unemployed, they were considered to be desirable immigrants. The 
municipalities were given a free rein to request deportations, but the Immi-
gration Branch retained the right to make a final decision based on an 
established immigration policy. 
If any prejudice existed in the deportation policy, it continued to 
be directed against immigrants who had seen assisted. British immigrants 
who had arrived under one of the numerous Empire Settlement Act 
agreements were more likely to be deported than immigrants who had paid 
their own passage. 104 The large juvenile migration which had occurred 
in the late 1920s was due to the free passages provided under that act. 
Statistics reveal that British boys were deported at an alarming rate from 
April to September 1930. Eighty-one were deported and twenty were 
returned by the organizations which had sponsored them (Table 2). 105 
The reasons were largely related either to the boys' unemployment or to 
crimes against persons or property. Only twelve percent of the eighty-
. one were deported for medical causes. The fact that fifty of these boys 
102 Winnipeg Tribune, 14 December 1932. 
103 IB, F. 563236(16), City Clerk, Winnipeg, to Minister, 19 December 1933. 
104 In 1919 the British government gave free passage to veterans or war widows, 
and their families. In 1923 the federal and various provincial governments joined the British 
government under the Empire Settlement Act to assist the unemployed to leave Great 
Britain. 
105 PAC, RG 26, Citizenship and Immigration Records, Vol. 16, Immigration Under 
Empire Settlement Scheme. 
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Table 2. -BRITISH JUVENILE BOYS DEPORTED, APRIL-SEPTEMBER 1930. 
Cause 
Assault 
Indecent Assault 
Incendiarism 
Break and Enter, Theft 
Loitering, Vagrancy 
Malicious Damage 
Trespassing 
Public Charge 
False Pretence 
Insanity 
Epilepsy 
Tuberculosis 
Total 
Number 
3 
3 
1 
18 
14 
1 
1 
29 
1 
6 
2 
2 
81 
Source : PAC, RG 26, Vol. 16, Immigration under Empire Settlement Scheme. 
had arrived within the past year added to the suspicions about the recruit-
ment of these immigrants. In 1931 this group created further problems 
because a number ''exhibited a disinclination to work preferring rather to 
impose on the sympathy and credulity of the pubic in towns and cities". 106 
Juvenile migration was immediately reduced to a trickle, but the deporta-
tions continued for a number of years. 
The immigration of British houseworkers under the Empire Settle-
ment Act produced similar problems. Between 1926 and 1930, some 18,790 
houseworkers received passage assistance and loans to come to Canada, 
as well as receiving "aftercare" assistance in Canada. Of this group, 877 
had been deported by 1936 and eighty had had their deportations suspended. 
One particular group of houseworkers which arrived in 1929 and 1930 had 
a twelve percent deportation rate. The supervisor of the Women's Branch, 
in view of an over-all deportation rate of 4.5 percent, argued that ''no 
girl was sent home who was in good health, had a good record and was 
able to take a houseworker situation". 107 The land settlement programme 
also had their share of problems. These immigrants, who were to have 
been specially selected, had received a $1,500 loan from the British govern-
ment and were supervised in Canada by Canadian officials. The "500 New 
Brunswick Family Settlement Scheme", for example, received 359 families 
between 1929 and 1931. By mid-November 1930, two families had already 
been deported. By April 1934, over seven percent of these selected immi-
grants had' been deported. 108 
106 DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND COLONIZATION, Annual Report, 1931/32, 
p. 80. 
107 DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND COLONIZATION, Annual Report, \933/34, 
p . 89; IB, F. 594293, Report on Hostel Trainees arrived April 1929 - 31 March 1931, 
31 December 1934. 
108 IB, F. 266687(3), Report, 15 November 1930; IB, F. 266687(5), Memorandum, 
April1934. 
Table 3.- DEPORTATIONS, FOR FISCAL YEAR OF 1933-1934, 
OF BRITISH SUBJECTS WHO HAD ARRIVED UNDER ASSISTED PASSAGE. 
Type of Assisted Passage Males Females Children Canadian-Born Total 
EMPIRE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
3,000 Family Settlement Scheme 21 18 37 14 90 
Families for other Farm Placement 1 1 1 2 5 
New Brunswick Family Settlement 23 21 67 13 124 
Nominations 31 20 24 15 90 
British Settlement Society of Canada 9 ll 15 3 38 
Canadian National Railways 22 6 8 6 42 1::1 
Canadian Pacific Railways 53 35 66 23 177 tT1 
Ontario Government ll lO 19 8 48 ~ 
Hudson Bay Company 6 3 ll 1 21 ~ 
Salvation Army 4 3 7 5 17 > 
Alberta Government 2 0 0 0 2 '":l 
-United Church of Canada 1 0 0 2 3 0 z 
Ministry of Labour Trainees (British) l3 0 0 2 15 
'"r:l 
Nova Scotia Government 1 0 0 0 1 ::-:l 
Family Reunion Scheme 1 4 12 4 21 0 s:: Clan Donald 4 4 9 1 18 () 
Domestics 0 104 1 49 154 > 
Juvenile Boys 126 0 10 1 137 z 
> Juvenile Girls 0 2 0 0 2 1::1 
> 
Total 327 242 287 149 1,005 
OTHER SCHEMES 
British Dominions Emigration Society 15 20 47 7 89 
Ministry of Labour (British) 97 0 0 3 100 
Navy League 3 2 5 2 12 
Society for the Overseas Settlement of British Women 0 20 49 8 77 
Others 6 3 9 2 20 
Total 121 45 llO 22 298 
GRAND TOTAL 448 287 397 171 1,303 
""'" 
~ 
~
Source: PAC, RG 26, Vol. 16, Fiscal Year Statements. 
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The number of British immigrants who had received passage assistance 
between 1923 and 1930 was less than thirty percent, but they constituted 
a large proportion of the deportations. For example, in the fiscal year 
1933-34 they accounted for forty-eight percent of the British who were 
deported. As Table 3 indicates, these immigrants came under the 
sponsorship of various organizations which had received certain powers of 
selection from the Immigration Branch. Experience demonstrated that 
this confidence was misplaced. 
Another large migration of the late 1920s was that of Eastern Euro-
peans under the Railways' Agreement. Between 1925 and 1930 the 
Canadian railways recruited some 120,000 adult males who were given 
certificates which claimed that they were agriculturalists, while 11,600 
women were certified as houseworkers. With dependents the migration 
totalled some 170,000. 109 The Immigration Branch had been opposed 
to the Railways' Agreement because it undermined its ability to select 
the immigrants, but the arrangement was imposed on the Branch by the 
King Government. 110 During the 1920s few of these immigrants were 
deported despite the vigilance of the immigration officials. During the 
Great Depression, however, 4,000 - less than 2.5 percent of the total 
migration - were deported. 111 Public charges constituted fifty-five percent 
of such deportees during 1930 through 1932. This was a smaller proportion 
than the average for total deportations. Another significant feature of these 
statistics is the high proportion of unattached males deported. This is not 
entirely surprising in view of the fact that at least 105,000 of the men 
arriving under the Railways' Agreement were not accompanied by wives. 
There was no concerted effort made to deport immigrants from Eastern 
Europe. 
Many immigrants became disillusioned with Canada during the 
depression and sought to be deported. They wanted to return to their 
former homes and, in many cases, to rejoin their families. Some had 
exhausted their funds in Canada while many others had sent their earnings 
to their families in Europe and then demanded free passage. The Immigra-
tion Branch was somewhat reluctant to deport all those wishing to return 
home. 
In a large number of the cases eportation was sollicited by the persons 
themselves and a considerable propo ·on of these positively refused to consider 
accepting any kind of employment, p ferring to return to their own homes . 
In cases of persons other than those of e undesirable classes, the department 
effected deport · only where it was established that such action was the 
one practicabl solut n to the problem. 1 2 
109 IB, F. 193745( , lair to C ar, 21 January 1936. AVERY, 'Dangerous For-
eigners' , p. 91, uses the figure o , 5 immigrants, but this included immigrants from all 
of continental Europe, and not just the area where the Railways' Agreement operated. 
110 IB, F. 216882(1), Egan to Beatty, 29 July 1925 ; J. A. Robb to Beatty, 1 Septem-
ber 1925. 
111 IB, F . 351406, Undated tables of statistics ; PAC, RG 26, Vol. 16, Alien Citizens 
of countries in which Railway Agreement operates. 
112 IMMIGRATION AND CoLONIZATION , Annual Report , 1931/32, p. 72. 
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Prime Minister Bennett also received numerous requests for deportation 
from British immigrants. 113 Not all of these requests were favourably 
received because in some cases domicile had been acquired, and when 
the individuals were agriculturalists there was a reluctance to comply. 
Some European consuls complained that the immigrants were made to stay 
in Canada longer than they had wished because deportation proceedings 
were too slow. 114 
In 1932 the Immigration Branch began to keep statistics on the dis-
position of public-charge cases. Of the 7, 758 deported as public charges 
during 1932 and 1933, over forty percent had applied for deportation. 115 
Of those ordered deported after investigation, it was found that twenty-
eight percent were unwilling to accept available employment and that 
another twelve percent believed employment opportunities to be better in 
their native countries. Only ten percent registered a determination to 
remain in Canada by appealing the deportation. The seven percent classified 
as medically unfit were debarred from appealing the order. These statistics, 
divided between British and non-British, indicate that the British requested 
deportations more frequently because they anticipated employment on 
their return. Thus, far fewer British appealed the deportation order. Sta-
tistics compiled from monthly reports from November 1932 to December 
1935 (Table 4) show a similar pattern. This information indicates that, as 
the depression lengthened, more individuals requested deportation. While 
Winnipeg and, likely, other municipalities, resorted to using "voluntary" 
deportation forms to reduce relief costs, it is obvious that large numbers 
of immigrants did use deportation as a means of escaping unemployment 
in Canada. 
The threat of communism was a very real concern of the Bennett 
Government, and it was not ignored by the Immigration Branch. Although 
it was recognized that the communists were only a small group, there was 
a growing fear that the "unemployed, undomiciled wanderer" could provide 
a large number of new recruits. 116 Unrest among the unemployed and 
aggressive organizing by the Communists in 1931, led to the arrest of 
prominent members of the Communist Party of Canada in August under 
the criminal code. In November, after a ten-day trial, eight were convicted 
of belonging to an "unlawful assemby" and of seditious conspiracy. 
Although the seven foreign-born were recommended for deportation after 
serving their sentences, only one was eventually deported. 117 
113 Bennett Papers, Vol. 372, Files D-186-D, D-187, D-188; IB, F. 563236(15), Blair 
to Little, II January 1933. 
114 IB, F. 80671, K. Moser, Consul-General, Czechoslovakia, to J . M. Langlais, 
Montreal agent, 1 August 1932. 
115 IB, F. 563236(15), Statistical tables, "Immigrants Deported as Public Charges 
during the Calendar Years 1932 and 1933". 
116 IB, F. 500761, Blair to Gordon, 15 August 1931. 
117 Ivan AVAKUMOVIC, The Communist Party in Canada (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, 1975), pp. 85-88; A. RAsPORICH, "Torno Cacic: Rebel without a Country", 
Canadian Ethnic Studies, X, 2 (Spring 1978): 86-94. 
Table 4.- STATEMENTS OF PERSONS DEPORTED AS PUBLIC CHARGES FROM 1 NOVEMBER 1932 TO 31 DECEMBER 1935. 
DESIRE FOR DEPORTA TION BASED ON Country of Origin Total 
A B c D E F G Statements 
Austria 17 2 2 5 3 1 1 31 
Belgium 5 4 0 1 4 0 1 15 
British Empire : 
England 872 250 26 84 212 88 65 1,597 
Ireland, Northern 140 33 9 7 18 46 0 253 
Ireland, Free State 21 17 2 4 5 12 4 65 
Scotland 605 163 12 32 143 72 20 1,047 
Wales 141 39 9 18 21 32 2 262 
Africa, South 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 
Australia 3 0 1 3 1 9 1 18 
Bermuda 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
West Indies 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 3 
Guiana 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Lesser British Isles 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 10 
Newfoundland 6 6 0 0 0 1 1 14 
New Zealand 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Bulgaria 12 1 0 0 2 2 0 17 
Czechoslovakia 44 48 0 9 7 27 6 141 
Danzig 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Esthonia 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 3 
Finland 46 100 23 30 20 40 29 289 
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France 0 3 0 0 1 0 2 6 
Germany 113 38 6 36 38 23 6 260 
Holland 18 1 3 1 2 7 0 32 
Hungary 30 43 5 14 11 29 10 142 
Italy 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 4 
Jugoslavia 13 45 6 17 13 22 12 128 
Latvia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Lithuania 8 3 0 1 2 9 4 27 
Roland 112 71 16 32 18 96 15 360 
Romania 70 73 7 21 16 23 20 230 
Russia 14 0 0 0 1 2 0 17 
Scandinavia: 
Denmark 34 17 1 5 2 17 3 78 
Norway 21 4 1 7 8 12 8 61 
Sweden 21 9 6 3 8 17 13 77 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Switzerland 2 4 0 2 0 3 0 11 
Ocean Port Total 2,390 978 135 335 564 593 226 5,221 
USA 23 9 0 22 29 25 34 142 
Grand Total 2,413 987 135 357 593 618 260 5,363 
As % of Total Statements 45.8 18.7 2.6 6.4 10.8 11.4 4.3 100.0 
Source: PAC, RG 26, Vol. 16, Public Charge Deports, 1931-37. 
A = Applications to Department for deportation; B = Refusal to consider employment; C = Demand for impossible wages or working 
conditions; D = Illness; E = Anticipation of employment in native country ; F = Appeals dismissed ; G = Readiness to consider employ-
ment but no appeal. 
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Before the prosecution of the Communist leaders there had been few 
deportations for radical activity, but afterwards "communist agitators" 
became targets for deportation. 118 Between April and December 1931, 
twenty-four were deported for various reasons ranging from assault to 
distributing communist literature. The only attempt at an organized and 
concerted effort of deportation occurred in May 1932. In Winnipeg, Sud-
bury and Montreal, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police arrested nine men 
for their participation in local May Day celebrations and immediately 
transported them to Halifax. On 13 May eight were charged under Section 
41 of the Immigration Act and were ordered deported. Appeal of the order 
was dismissed, as were appeals to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia 
and the Supreme Court of Canada. 119 Although this time the government 
succeeded in deporting ''dangerous foreigners'', it was December before 
the legal appeals were exhausted and the order could be carried out. As 
in 1919, the government had failed in an effort to bring about the rapid 
deportation of radicals. 
The attempt to arrest individuals and transport them half-way across 
the country without any trial did not go without comment. J. S. Woods-
worth attacked the action in the House of Commons, and a few news-
papers lamented this travesty of justice. The Toronto Star rose to the fore 
by labelling Royal Canadian Mounted Police the "Canadian Cheka" and by 
pointing to the plight of civil rights under the Bennett Government. 120 
Canadians, however, as indicated by the majority of the daily press accepted 
this action as appropriate, if not necessary. Bennett, in what became 
known as his "iron heel" speech, warned Canadians that democratic 
institutions had to be defended : 
These so-called groups of socialists and communists .. . are sowing their seeds 
everywhere. Right in this city of Toronto, such propaganda is being carried 
on, and in the little out-of-the-way places the same injurious work is being 
done. We know that throughout Canada this propaganda is being put forward 
by organizations from foreign lands that seek to destroy our institutions. Now 
ladies and gentlemen, we ask every true Canadian to put the heel of ruthless-
ness against a thing of that kind. 121 
These were strong sentiments, but his government lacked the will to be 
entirely ruthless. 
The number of deportations was exceedingly small. In 1932 a total 
of forty-two communist agitators were deported; in 1933 and 1934 there 
were a further sixteen. Of the eighty-two "communist agitators" deported 
118 PAC, RG 26, Vol. 16, Communist Agitators. 
119 IB, F. 513111, Deportation Order for Dan Holmes, 7 December 1931; Notice 
of Appeal, Dan Holmes, 9 May 1932; Minutes of Board of Inquiry, Halifax, 6 May 1932; 
Receipt for Delivery of Immigrant, 23 January 1933; F. 513116, Notice of Appeal, Arvo 
Vaara, 13 May 1932; Reference to Supreme Court of Canada, 17 May 1932; Receipt for 
Delivery of Immigrant, 17 December 1932; W. R. Little to W. J. Egan, Deputy Minister, 
30 December 1932. 
12° Commons Debates, III (1932): 2658, 2683-87, 2690-96; S. M. BREEZE, "Editorial 
Response to Communism in the English Language Press during the 1930's" (M.A. thesis, 
Carleton University, 1970), pp. 22-37. 
121 The Canadian Unionist, December 1932, p. 113. 
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during 1931 through 1934 less than a handful were organizers of the com-
munist movement in Canada. The leadership of the Communist Party of 
Canada, almost exclusively foreign-born, was not deported. The vast 
majority of those deported were simply individuals who took part in labour 
strikes or in protest marches and demonstrations against inadequate wages 
and relief measures. Their frustration found expression in radical rhetoric 
and at times in violence. This caused local authorities to seek the depor-
tation of "trouble-makers". Only about thirty percent of these individuals 
were deported from the major urban centres. Most came from smaller 
centres such as Rouyn, Sudbury, Kirkland Lake, Fort William, Timmins, 
Dauphin, Lethbridge, Fort Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Estevan, Drumheller 
and The Pas. Only three agitators were deported from Winnipeg, a city 
noted for the radicalism of its immigrant population. The immigration of-
ficer in that city did not see a justification for deportation on these grounds : 
Some of the men are perhaps Communists, or, owing to present conditions, 
are showing by their action leaning to Communism, or they are receiving 
legal advice from that source. I might state, however, that I do not think 
that these men were Communists, or had any ideas of this kind before they 
came to Canada. 122 
The majority of Canadians, however, resented criticism by these indi-
viduals. Many would have agreed with Major-General MacBrien, the 
Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, when he told a 
group of war veterans that "many of them have not been here long, 
and I have always felt that if they do not like the way we live and want 
to uproot our institutions, the best thing to do would be to send them 
back where they came from in every possible way." 123 There was no 
mass repatriation of the unemployed nor, with the exception of the May 
Day arrests in 1932, was there any attempt to use deportations to destroy 
the Left in Canada. 
The deportations peaked during 1932, and declined streadily because 
fewer and fewer people were within reach of the legislation and because 
the pressure by municipalities for deportation eased. By 1935-36 just over 
600 people were deported and by 1938-39 it had declined to 434. The 
proportion of deportations for medical and public-charge causes was the 
lowest ever, while the proportion deported for criminality remained high. 
The single largest reason for deportation during the latter 1930s was 
illegal entry. Since many immigrants were beyond the reach of deportation 
on traditional grounds, there was a special effort made to establish that 
the "undesirables" had entered Canada illegally. The Mackenzie King 
Government was not prepared to adopt any revision of the deportation 
policy. 124 
122 IB, F. 563236(15), T. Gelley to Jolliffee, 30 October 1931. 
12 3 Canadian Forum, July 1932, pp. 367-68. 
124 AVERY, 'Dangerous Foreigners', p. 139. He states that the "King government 
quickly repealed both Section 98 of the Criminal Code and Section 141 of the Immigration 
Act". The notorious 1919 amendment of Section 41 had been amended in June 1928, but 
not so as to restrict the power to deport. No further changes were made in the 1930s. 
Section 98 of the criminal code was repealed in June 1936, but at the same time the sub-
stance of the section was transferred to Section 133 of the criminal code. 
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The initial function of deportations was to return immigrants who did 
not become self-sufficient soon after their arrival, and who were not likely 
to do so in the near future. Canadians felt that immigrants who failed 
to become independent were incapable of doing so and, consequently, 
they were undesirable as citizens. These ideals of independence and self-
reliance were inherited from the frontier society, and had been adopted 
to explain the progress and prosperity of America. As the need for social 
services increased, especially in urban centres, fears about the decline of 
Canadian values and the breakdown of the society began to preoccupy 
the middle class. When it was pointed out that many immigrants were 
among those requiring assistance, pressure to have them deported in-
creased. Canadians, especially the middle class, hardened themselves to this 
policy because they lacked the self-assurance and confidence which would 
have allowed them to adapt to the emerging urban, industrial society. 
Deportation of public charges was also motivated by a more base 
concern of the middle class - money. During economic recessions when 
municipal ratepayers were faced with costs which exceeded levels which 
they were willing to shoulder, the demands for deportations intensified. 
Local governments also refused to be responsible for immigrants requiring 
medical care, whether physical or mental. It was commonly believed that 
much of the problem originated outside of Canada, that ''undesirables'' 
were being "dumped" in Canada. This view, reinforced by the frequent 
problems encountered with British assisted immigrants, made it. easy to 
rationalize what were in reality economy measures. 
The deportation of criminals was a much more straight-forward 
matter. Between 1902 and 1939 just over thirty percent of the persons 
deported were returned for criminal activity. The information on the 
nature of the crimes indicates that the vast majority were crimes against 
persons and property, as well as violations of the Opium and Narcotic 
Drug Act. There also were crimes against society such as vagrancy, 
loitering, prostitution and immorality. These crimes, which offended the 
work ethic and puritanism of the middle class, were not numerous. 
Significantly, like the public-charge deportations, they rose during periods 
of economic stress when the middle class felt itself threatened. 
Individuals advocating political change were kept under surveillance 
by the nation's security forces, and, on a few occasions, by the Immigra-
tion Branch. While at least one organizer of the Ku Klux Klan was de-
ported, and pro-Nazi Germans were investigated, the Immigration Branch 
generally focused on leftist supporters. 125 About one hundred individuals 
who were considered by the government to be radical agitators were 
deported prior to World War II. The crimes of the majority were that 
they reacted against conditions in Canada during periods of economic 
125 IB, F. 352190, File on deportation of J. H. Hawkins, Ku Klux Klan organizer, 
1928. 
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stress. Since many resorted to violence, or were public charges, deporta-
tions were routine. Section 41 was used on the few occasions when there 
were attempts to obtain the deportation of organizers. Overall, the small 
number of these deportations indicates that there was no concerted effort 
to deport radicals. 
The deportation policy was not designed to discipline immigrants, 
to force them to conform to the work ethic and embrace capitalism, 126 
nor did it function as a modified gastarbeiter policy to control surplus 
labour. Although the threat of deportation undoubtedly encouraged some 
recent immigrants to accept low-paying jobs, it could not have seriously 
affected wage levels in Canada. Deportation was an expedient solution 
to the problem of inadequate social services, a problem which middle-class 
Canadians wanted to and did evade. To some extent it also served to 
defuse the conflict between interests which wanted, and largely obtained, 
large-scale immigration and the middle-class elements which feared the 
influx of people with different cultural and social values. 
Though only about one percent of the total immigration was deported, 
the programme was not without its effects on the immigrants and on 
Canada. For some immigrants deportation actually offered a measure of 
relief, but for many others it represented a humiliating defeat in their 
efforts to establish life in a new land. They came for economic reasons, 
and they were frequently deported for the same reasons. In Canada the 
ejection of these tens of thousands of' 'undesirables'' most certainly helped 
the middle-class conservatives to delay the establishment of needed social 
services. Only after the adoption of a basic system of social services in 
the post-war period was the deportation of public charges reduced to a 
minor cause. 
126 This is not to say that such aims never crossed the minds of officials or entered 
into Cabinet discussions, for they certainly did; but the important point is that the deportation 
policy was never designed for these specific purposes. As to what extent the immigrants 
saw deportation in this light requires a separate study. 
